Nonviolent protests are twice as likely to succeed as armed conflicts – and those engaging a threshold of 3.5% of the population have never failed to bring about change.
Violent campaigns on the other hand were defined as follows: “Violent resistance […] involves
the use of force to physically harm or threaten to harm the opponent.” (Chenoweth/Shay 2020:
5). Violent campaign data was primarily collected from different databases including: The
UCDP Armed Conflict Database, the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW),
Clodfelter’s encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), and Kalev Sepp’s list of major
counterinsurgency operations (2005) (Chenoweth/Shay 2020: 5).
To note is that should a campaign at some point during its lifespan shift from a non-violent
campaign to a violent one or vice versa, that this campaign is then coded as two separate
campaigns (Chenoweth/Shay 2020: 7).
This led me to believe they are analysing in a vacuum but that would only really be true for the Philippines example.
This review is a fantastic in depth analysis of the data and outcomes when violent flanks (apparently the research term describing the parallel movements that are not nonviolent) are included.
Two tables analyse the purported and contradictory outcomes of the flanks in different research projects and papers. The authors conclusions are interesting to me in that he or she believes them to reduce long term success and increase short and mid terms, and also poiints out other factors in table 3 that affect the outcomes. One thing eluded to is that the societies perception of the movements being majority violent or non violent is actually the determining factor in the outcome and that I agree with in societies that presuppose nonviolence as a determining factor for success. I imagine nonviolence is a lit less important when you see yourself as occupied by an external force.
It did give the info needed to find this.
https://discuss-data.net/dataset/4a6a6c0c-1ca0-41ff-83de-39d22b55ef64/files/eddc4a97-5499-40c9-9a0e-d0c9147f0bac/
Violent campaigns on the other hand were defined as follows: “Violent resistance […] involves the use of force to physically harm or threaten to harm the opponent.” (Chenoweth/Shay 2020: 5). Violent campaign data was primarily collected from different databases including: The UCDP Armed Conflict Database, the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW), Clodfelter’s encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), and Kalev Sepp’s list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005) (Chenoweth/Shay 2020: 5). To note is that should a campaign at some point during its lifespan shift from a non-violent campaign to a violent one or vice versa, that this campaign is then coded as two separate campaigns (Chenoweth/Shay 2020: 7).
This led me to believe they are analysing in a vacuum but that would only really be true for the Philippines example.
This review is a fantastic in depth analysis of the data and outcomes when violent flanks (apparently the research term describing the parallel movements that are not nonviolent) are included.
https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051421-124128#f1
Two tables analyse the purported and contradictory outcomes of the flanks in different research projects and papers. The authors conclusions are interesting to me in that he or she believes them to reduce long term success and increase short and mid terms, and also poiints out other factors in table 3 that affect the outcomes. One thing eluded to is that the societies perception of the movements being majority violent or non violent is actually the determining factor in the outcome and that I agree with in societies that presuppose nonviolence as a determining factor for success. I imagine nonviolence is a lit less important when you see yourself as occupied by an external force.
Thanks! That’s very comprehensive.